Security policy
This product handles real people's phone numbers, street addresses and SMS conversations. If you have found a way to reach any of that — or to send SMS as a business using it — we want to hear from you before anyone else does.
Reporting a vulnerability
Please include enough to reproduce it: the endpoint, app version or commit, the request or steps, and what you were able to observe or change. A proof-of-concept is welcome and never required — a clear description of the flaw is worth more than a working exploit.
- Acknowledgement within 3 business days. If you do not hear back in that time, assume the mail did not arrive and send it again.
- An assessment within 10 business days, including whether we consider it a vulnerability and, if so, a rough remediation date.
- 90 days from your report to public disclosure, or sooner once a fix is released. If we need longer we will say so and explain why; we will not ask you to stay quiet indefinitely.
Safe harbour
We will not pursue legal action, or ask anyone else to, over good-faith research that follows this policy: testing only against your own installation or infrastructure you own, avoiding access to other people's data, and giving us a reasonable chance to fix the issue before publishing.
If you access someone else's data by accident — which is possible in exactly the class of bug we care most about — stop, tell us, and delete what you retrieved. That is not a rule violation; not telling us would be.
There is no bug bounty. We would rather say so plainly than leave it ambiguous.
Scope
In scope
- The iOS app — the agent, its persistence, the Face ID gate, the iCloud mirror, and the credentials it holds.
- The relay — the public HTTPS endpoint, its Twilio webhook, device enrolment, the message queue, and the provisioning routes.
- The app-to-relay protocol: bearer auth, device request signing, TLS pinning, and the silent-push and catch-up paths.
Out of scope, deliberately, because they are unauthenticated by design and documented as such:
- The test-mode operator console. It has no authentication at all; it is bound to loopback and reached over an SSH tunnel, and it is never enabled in production.
- The LAN test rig and the plaintext HTTP it serves on a private network.
- The demo business profile shipped with a fresh install. Demo Home Services is fictional, its phone number is unroutable, and its sample conversations are authored fixtures rather than real leads.
- Findings that require a jailbroken or physically compromised device already unlocked by its owner.
- Reports generated by automated scanners with no demonstrated impact.
Design commitments you can hold us to
These are product promises, so a way around any of them is a vulnerability report even if nothing obviously "leaks":
- No customer message content reaches an AI provider in the default on-device build. The relay is transport-only: it never persists a message body and never calls a model. Which mode a given release uses is stated in the privacy policy and shown in the app's Settings screen.
- STOP and UNSUBSCRIBE are honoured immediately, unconditionally, and durably at the relay.
- The agent states no fact outside the business profile — prices, guaranteed times and commitments especially.
- Every conversation's first agent message discloses that it is automated.